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Neural activity associated with self-reflection
Uwe Herwig1,2, Tina Kaffenberger1, Caroline Schell1,3, Lutz Jäncke4 and Annette B. Brühl1*
Abstract
Background: Self-referential cognitions are important for self-monitoring and self-regulation. Previous studies have
addressed the neural correlates of self-referential processes in response to or related to external stimuli. We here
investigated brain activity associated with a short, exclusively mental process of self-reflection in the absence of
external stimuli or behavioural requirements. Healthy subjects reflected either on themselves, a personally known or
an unknown person during functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). The reflection period was initialized by a
cue and followed by photographs of the respective persons (perception of pictures of oneself or the other person).
Results: Self-reflection, compared with reflecting on the other persons and to a major part also compared with
perceiving photographs of one-self, was associated with more prominent dorsomedial and lateral prefrontal, insular,
anterior and posterior cingulate activations. Whereas some of these areas showed activity in the “other”-conditions
as well, self-selective characteristics were revealed in right dorsolateral prefrontal and posterior cingulate cortex for
self-reflection; in anterior cingulate cortex for self-perception and in the left inferior parietal lobe for self-reflection
and -perception.
Conclusions: Altogether, cingulate, medial and lateral prefrontal, insular and inferior parietal regions show
relevance for self-related cognitions, with in part self-specificity in terms of comparison with the known-, unknown-
and perception-conditions. Notably, the results are obtained here without behavioural response supporting the
reliability of this methodological approach of applying a solely mental intervention. We suggest considering the
reported structures when investigating psychopathologically affected self-related processing.
Background
Humans not only have a neural representation of the ex-
ternal and social world, they also have the ability to rep-
resent themselves as coherent human beings and as a
self. They can reflect on themselves as a person and they
have a neural representation of their own body. Under-
standing the basis of neural self-representation is not
only interesting from a philosophical or scientific point
of view but may also have practical implications in
psychiatry, for example, in understanding disturbed self-
related functions occurring during depression [1].
In the last decade, a growing number of studies has
assessed the neural bases of self-related processes using
functional neuroimaging methods [2-11] and electrical
tomographic techniques [12]. In these studies, brain activ-
ity was examined, for example, while viewing photographs
of oneself compared to that obtained while viewing photo-
graphs of other persons, or while recognizing one’s own
face, names, voices or morphed photographs [3,4,13-19].
Other approaches have addressed the relevance of trait
adjectives with reference to oneself and compared brain
activity to that occurring under control conditions, for ex-
ample reference of trait adjectives to close friends or
others, or have applied more complex self-referential tasks
which required responses to external stimuli [2,3,12,20-
25]. Self-referential memory [26-28], emotional domains
[29,30] and cognitive aspects in the spatial domain such as
navigational tasks or perspective-taking tasks [31,32] have
also been examined. Self-reference has been further stud-
ied in relation to the external world or from the perspec-
tive of the self as an object, i.e. from the perspective of a
third-person [9,33,34] or relative to certain features of the
self, for example individual goals [35], psychological
aspects [36] and social issues [20].
Recent meta-analyses of functional neuroimaging stud-
ies have confirmed the involvement of certain brain
regions in self-referential processes [6,10,37]: medial pre-
frontal cortex (MPFC), anterior and posterior cingulate
cortices (ACC, PCC) and (pre)cuneus, which also reflect
the concept of cortical midline areas and self-reference
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[38]. Further, the lateral and ventromedial prefrontal,
medial temporal, and parieto-temporal regions, the insu-
lar cortex and other regions were found to be active dur-
ing self-referential processes [6,9,10,25,37].
From a methodological perspective, all these studies
have in common that they examine the neural bases of
self-reference in response to external stimuli or in com-
parison to behavioural tasks potentially involving other
cognitive domains. This could make it difficult to assess
self-referential activity possible interferences from neural
activity related to external cognitions or actions. Cer-
tainly, these studies acknowledged the methodological
issue of implementing behavioural controls. However, it
may be of value to assess whether or not the brain areas
reported are also active during a restrictively mental and
not behavioural self-referential condition, and whether
these areas show more or less specific activity for self-
reference than other areas in terms of activation during
self-reflection but not during reflection about others or
during self-photo perception. In this study, we investi-
gated the neural processes underlying self-reference in
the sense of self-reflection, however, compared to other
studies without possibly interfering for instance visual or
verbal stimuli. The term “self-reflection” comprises at
very least processes such as becoming aware of and
reflecting on one’s current and past experiences and
one’s self-concept, including the self-relevance of trait
words [39]. The division between self-reflection, and
self-recognition or self-awareness and even self-
consciousness is not clear-cut [38,40,41]. Some authors
have defined self-reflection as cognitively reflecting on
one’s sense of self, i.e. on a collection of schema regard-
ing one’s abilities and traits [42]. Accordingly, we here
aimed to direct the subjects to reflect on themselves as a
person and on their identity. This was realized by issuing
a concrete instruction to the subject for self-reflection
(e.g. “who am I?”), whereby the subjects could select
their own content. As control condition, we instructed
subjects to reflect on a personal acquaintance of the
same gender. This was to control for the process of
reflecting on a personally known person and the related
knowledge and memory. Subjects were further requested
to reflect on an unknown person who was introduced to
them by photograph prior to the functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI) session. This controlled for
general reflection on a person. In order to intensify re-
flection, we also presented photographs of the respective
persons after the reflection period. Considering the un-
conventional methodological approach with respect to
non-implementation of a behavioural control, we applied
very conservative statistics.
Our hypothesis was that the solely mental task of self-
reflection would still be associated with brain activity
particularly in cortical midline regions such as the
medial prefrontal (MPFC) and cingulate cortices, but also
in ventrolateral and dorsolateral prefrontal and insular
regions and in lateral parietal cortex areas [2,9,25,43]. We
predicted different activities for mental self-reflection than
for perception of self-related stimuli, thus insinuating self-
reflection specific activation. In addition, we were inter-
ested in whether or not certain brain regions are specific-
ally associated with self-reflection (refl-self) and self-
perception (perc-self ) when compared to those areas asso-
ciated with reflections on other persons (refl-known, refl-
unknown) or the perception of photographs of other per-
sons (perc-known, perc-unknown).
Results
The primary contrast in the reflection period (1), a con-
junction of (refl-self> refl-known) & (refl-self> refl-
unknown), revealed those regions of the brain with
greater activity under the self-condition compared to
these for known-reflection and unknown-reflection,
which were among others the bilateral insular and
ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (Ins/VLPFC) areas, the
ACC, the PCC and the dorsal MPFC (DMPFC; Table 1a).
The left Ins/VLPFC region, right DLPFC, DMPFC, and
PCC showed also more prominent activity in the second
conjoined contrast (2), adding (refl-self> perc-self ) to
contrast (1), under the conditions of self-reflection com-
pared to self-perception (Table 1b, Figure 1).
Assessing the contribution of the single conditions
within the resulting clusters, the activity during refl-self
was, as expected, most pronounced, although activity
was also present during the other conditions of reflec-
tion. In contrast, the activity associated with perc-self
was not significant compared to the baseline (Figure 2A,
B). The DMPFC was significantly active relative to the
baseline (t = 9.6) during refl-self, whereas there was no
activity during perc-self (t = 0.6; Figure 2A). However,
the DMPFC was also active under the conditions of both
refl-known (t = 5.9) and refl-unknown (t = 4.5) when
compared to the baseline although these activities were
significantly less than those for refl-self (refl-self> refl-
known: t = 4.4; refl-self> refl-unknown: t = 5.5). Compar-
able results were obtained for the left insular cortex and
adjacent inferior frontal gyrus (Figure 2B). The right
middle frontal gyrus corresponding to the dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) was active only in the self-
reflection condition (t = 6.2), which was significantly dif-
ferent to the other-conditions where the DLPFC showed
no activity or deactivation. The PCC showed equivalent
characteristics (refl-self t = 4.8) with no activation or
even deactivation in the other conditions.
When examining perception, in particular for the self-
specific conjunction (perc-self> perc-known) & (perc-
self> perc-unknown), activity analogous to that obtained
under the conditions of reflection was detected in the
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ACC, bilateral insular and ventrolateral prefrontal areas.
Additional activity was detected in the right inferior pa-
rietal lobe (IPL)/somatosensory cortex (SSC), intraparie-
tal sulcus and bilaterally in the surrounding area of the
temporo-occipital junction (Table 2, Figure 3). The ACC
activity was self-selective under the conditions of perc-self
(t = 2.8; perc-uk t = - 4.0, perc-kn t = - 1.4; perc-self> perc-
uk t = 5.7, perc-self> perc-kn t = 5.2) and in part under
the conditions of self-reflection (Figure 3A, Figure 2C;
refl-self t = 6.4, refl-kn t = 4.3, refl-uk t = 0.7; refl-self> refl-
uk t = 6.1, refl-self> refl-kn t = 3.5,).
The right IPL/SSC was the only region with significant
individual activity attributed to each of the refl-self
(t = 2.3) and perc-self (t = 3.2) condition separately and
with no significant activity under the conditions of known
and unknown (Figure 3B, Figure 2D), and further with dif-
ferences between the self- and other conditions (refl-self>
refl-uk t = 3.3, perc-self> perc-uk t = 4.5, refl-self> refl-kn
t = 1.6, perc-self> perc-kn t = 5.0). In occipital regions,
particularly in the cuneus, perc-self was associated with
less activity than under the other conditions of perception
(Table 2, Figure 3C).
Discussion
Brain activity associated with self-reflection
The objective of the present study was the identification
of brain regions involved in mental self-referential pro-
cessing during self-reflection upon exclusion of interfer-
ing external stimuli, tasks or specific self-referential
events. We determined activities in the insular, anterior
and posterior cingulate, ventrolateral prefrontal cortex and
DMPFC to be involved in the process of self-reference.
This emphasizes the role of cortical midline areas [38,44]
but also of lateral prefrontal and parietal areas, in self-
related processing as self-reflection and converges with the
findings of recent meta-analyses on neural correlates in
the field of self-referential processes [6,10,11,37], albeit
not a complete overlap of all brain regions. The temporo-
parietal junction (TPJ) was in our study only activated in
the picture presentation condition and not in the self-
reflection period. This makes sense when considering the
proposed role of the TPJ in distinguishing self and other
[10] which may be relevant in the perception condition
but less during self-reflection. Interestingly, except for in
the anterior cingulate cortex region, brain activity was
more pronounced when reflecting on oneself than when
viewing photographs of oneself. Right DLPFC and PCC
even showed self-reflection specific characteristics with
stronger activity than the other conditions which showed
no activation. The PCC is known to be involved in self-
referential processing [11,43], internally directed thoughts
[45] and autobiographic memory [46] which were all
involved in self-reflection in the current study. In parallel
to meta-analytic results on the overlap between self-
referential processes and brain regions known to be
involved in the default mode network (DMN, [11]) we
found prominent activation in the ACC and PCC in the
self-reflection condition. This result supports the func-
tional overlap between active and consciously induced self-
reflection and self-related mental processes during resting
Table 1 Analysis of the reflection period
Brodmann area Mean X Mean Y Mean Z Cluster size (mm3) t-max
a) Contrast (refl-self> refl-known) & (refl-self> refl-unknown)
Sup. frontal gyrus/DMPFC R, ACC/MCC 6/8/24/32 5 11 37 7132 4.7
Insula/inferior frontal gyrus R 13/45/47 36 23 2 3674 5.1
Insula/inferior frontal gyrus L 13/45/47 -36 21 6 7877 4.7
Middle frontal gyrus/DLPFC R 9 35 29 35 387 3.9
Middle frontal gyrus/DLPFC R 9/10 29 39 24 271 4.0
Middle insular cortex R 13 40 3 2 524 3.5
Midbrain - 2 -23 0 1361 3.8
Posterior cingulate cortex 23/24 2 -16 33 1281 4.4
Caudate nucleus - -17 -6 23 283 3.6
Subcallosal cingulate cortex L 13 -17 11 -10 719 3.9
b) Contrast (refl-self> refl-known) & (refl-self> refl-unknown) & (refl-self> perc-self)
Insula/inferior frontal gyrus L (Figure 1A) 13/44 -38 15 8 2495 3.9
Sup. frontal gyrus/DMPFC R (Figure 1B, 2A) 6 9 1 53 1964 4.1
Middle frontal gyrus/DLPFC R (Figure 1 C) 9/10 29 39 24 386 4.0
Posterior cingulate cortex (Figure 1D) 23/24 2 -19 34 636 4.2
Activity during self-reflection significantly larger (random effects analysis, p> 0.005, p< 0.01 Monte Carlo simulation corrected) than in the known and the
unknown reflection conditions.
Activation as in a) but also larger in the refl-self than in the perc-self condition.
Abbreviations: R right, L left. DLPFC dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, DMPFC dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, sup superior.
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states [11]. Within the frame of our applied conjunctions
and the selected statistical threshold, we revealed no rela-
tively stronger activity during self-reflection in ventro-
medial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC), which has been shown
in a comparable PET study on self-reflection [23]. Meta-
analyses found consistent results when including studies
using PET and fMRI [6,10,11]. However, the long duration
of the conditions (100 sec) in the PET study by d’Argem-
beau et al. could account for this difference in the VMPFC
in the two studies. Further, the applied conjunctions lead
to restricted results, whereby the single contrast of for in-
stance ‘self ’ versus ‘unknown’ reflection was accompanied
by VPMPC activity, which however is not reported in de-
tail here due to focusing on the primary question. Another
PET study [24], comparing reflections on personality traits
and the physical appearance of oneself compared to reflec-
tions on a specific famous person resulted in brain activity
in dorsolateral and medial prefrontal cortical regions,
which is comparable to our results. A recent study
attempted to disentangle differential functions of dorso-
and ventromedial prefrontal cortex, and detected primarily
deactivations in the VMPFC correlating with the degree of
self-descriptiveness and increasing activations in DMPFC
regions with increasing self-relevance of the given stimuli
[47]. It is also possible, that the lack of VMPFC-activation
in our study is related to the specific task with no specific
given stimuli which had to be judged regarding self-
relatedness. Our results and existing literature present evi-
dence for the involvement of insular, cingulate, ventrolat-
eral and dorsolateral and medial prefrontal cortical regions
in self-related processing and, as shown in this study, spe-
cifically in self-reflection.
Activations in the known and unknown conditions
Adding to the view that self-related processing activates,
in particular, midline prefrontal areas of the brain, our
Figure 1 Brain activity during reflection on oneself. Analysis of selected regions (yellow circles) with activation during reflecting on oneself,
resulting from the conjoined contrast (refl-self> refl-known) & (refl-self> refl-unknown) & (refl-self> perc-self) – (2). The colour-coded maps
indicate those areas of the brain with greater t activity during self-reflection than under all other conditions (p< 0.005, Monte Carlo simulation
with cluster wise correction p< 0.01). The time courses indicate the mean and standard errors of blood oxygen-level-dependent signal changes
under primary conditions. (A) DMPFC. (B) Ventrolateral prefrontal cortex and insula (VLPFC/Ins. L). (C) DLPFC R. (D) Posterior cingulate cortex
(PCC). All regions have greater activity during the reflection periods than during perception of the photograph. All other significant clusters were
also activated under the ‘other’-reflection-conditions.
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data also revealed activity in these regions during reflec-
tion on ‘known’ and ‘unknown’ persons, even although
the associated activity was lower than that associated
with reflection on oneself. This was indicated by analyz-
ing the various conditions of reflection relative to a base-
line and by analyzing local signal changes obtained by
Figure 2 Beta-weights (beta, y-axis) of the single contrasts. Given are the beta-weights within selected regions of interest, derived from the
contrast analyses in (A + B) reflection-self (r-self)> reflection-known (r-known) and -unknown (r-uk) and perc-self (p-self), and (C +D) perception-
self> perception-known (p-known) and -unknown (p-uk). (A) DMPFC, (B) left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex/insula (Ins L), (C) ACC, (D) right IPL/
SSC.
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Table 2 Analysis of the picture perception period
Brodmann area Mean X Mean Y Mean Z Cluster size mm3 t-max
Insula/inferior frontal gyrus R 13/47 -36 12 0 833 4.1
Insula/inferior frontal gyrus L 13/47 -36 12 0 833 4.1
Anterior cingulate cortex R (Figure 3A, 2 C) 24/32 2 20 23 5968 5.3
Superior parietal gyrus R 7 25 -61 43 3891 4.6
Inferior parietal lobule R (Figure 3B, 2D) 40/1/2/3 56 -28 35 938 4.0
Temporo-occipital junction R 19/20/37 45 -56 -7 6462 6.4
Occipital cortex R (Figure 3C) 17/18 10 -85 16 490 -3.9
Given are brain regions resulting from the contrast (perc-self> perc-known) & (perc-self> perc-unknown) with activity significantly larger during self-perception
and lower than in the known and the unknown condition (random effects analysis, p> 0.005, p< 0.01 Monte Carlo simulation corrected). Clusters with merely
deactivations in all conditions in the presentation period were not considered (e.g. bilateral superior/middle temporal gyrus). Abbreviations: R right, L left, med
medial. Reported are the mean Talairach coordinates of the respective clusters.
Figure 3 Brain activity during perception of pictures of oneself. Analysis of selected regions according to the contrast self-perception with
greater activity than under known and unknown perception (p< 0.005, Monte Carlo Simulation with cluster wise correction for multiple
comparisons p< 0.01). (A) ACC and (B) IPL/SSC R, which were also active during self-reflection. (C) The occipital visual cortex region was less
active during self-perception than under the other conditions.
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fMRI. Our results are in line with previous studies
addressing appraisal of oneself and appraisal under the
conditions of known and unknown persons [48-50]. The
condition ‘unknown’ was also associated with activity in
the MPFC and insular regions. The activity under the
conditions ‘known’ and ‘unknown’ may well be explained
by considering theory of mind [12,51-55]. When reflect-
ing on others, humans engage their mind and activate
self-related brain regions for mentalizing others and
mental state inference [48,56]. A related explanation is
that these brain regions are involved in social cognition
with self-related aspects as mirror neuron functions and
a co-representation of the self and others which have
been reported to involve respective prefrontal midline
regions [57-60]. One could argue that the subjects in
our study might have dealt with themselves under the
‘other’-conditions. However, our standardized instruc-
tions were easily understood by the subjects and they
were asked to verbally confirm that they had performed
the task precisely as instructed. Further, limitations in
the performance of the task would not explain the se-
lective activation in the anterior cingulate and somato-
sensory cortices under conditions of ‘self ’-reflection,
which strongly indicate a distinct task performance.
Studies using longer phases of reflection involved inten-
sive interviews on the content, self-relatedness and viv-
idness of imaginations, which is necessary to control for
interfering thoughts not related to the primary task.
However, the conditions we used were, being of less than
10 s duration, relatively short, such that we could initiate
the process of self-reflection by letting the subjects re-
flect on themselves under the question “who am I?” This
should have reduced fluctuations in cognition as well as
possible mind-wandering.
The primary visual cortex was less active when viewing
photographs of oneself than when viewing photographs of
other persons. This might be explained by the novelty and
unfamiliarity of the unknown person demanding more at-
tention and more cognition and, hence, a correspondingly
greater activity in the primary visual cortex [61].
Self-selective activations
The only regions of the brain that appeared to be of cer-
tain selectivity for self-related processing, in the sense of
not or hardly exerting activity under the ‘known’ and ‘un-
known’ conditions and with significantly stronger activity
associated with the self- compared to the ‘known‘and ‘un-
known’ conditions, were the ACC and somatosensory-
associated parietal areas for the perception period. The
term “self-specific” has to be used with caution [62]: in
agreement with Gillihan and Farah, we did not claim to
find structures solely involved in self-referential processes
but rather to analyse associations between brain regions
and self-reference which is also reflected in the overlap of
self and familiar other related brain regions in two meta-
analyses [10,11]. With regard to the objections of Gillihan
and Farah [62], our study tried to circumvent some of the
constraints of previous studies such as possible interfer-
ences of verbal or visual stimulus material used for refer-
ential processes with the aspect of self-reference itself.
Our study adds to the existing literature by using a more
naturalistic approach similar to everyday self-referential
thinking without direction onto specific stimuli and
contents.
The ACC was further more strongly stronger activated
during self-reflection compared to ‘known’ and unknown’
reflection, whenever the ‘known’ reflection exerted slight
activity. The ACC is known to be associated with conflict
monitoring and to detect discrepancies between the actual
and the desired state [63,64]. Functionally, cingulate
regions are known to mediate integration and evaluation
of emotional, motivational and cognitive information, and
to modulate attention [65,66] with direct connections to
the amygdala, thalamus, prefrontal and insular areas and
to the parietal lobe [67]. Thus, within a regulatory net-
work, the ACC may have the function of assessing
whether signals or stimuli have a relation to or relevance
for the person as was proposed by van der Meer et al. [6].
However, following the logic of the ACC functioning as a
discrepancy detector, why should it be active when one
reflects on oneself? In this study, we instructed the sub-
jects to reflect about whom they were and how they were.
This may have initiated autobiographical considerations
on the current state and the intended goals in life. The
task may thus have induced critical self-reflection and
have made the subject aware of discrepancies between
his/her actual state and desired state. This self-reflection
would, of course, be reduced, or perhaps not occur at all,
when reflecting on other persons. A recent study [14]
investigated brain activity in subjects viewing photographs
of their own face or body in comparison to the activity
when viewing photographs either of a close colleague or
of scrambled images. This also was associated with activa-
tion of the ACC, the right anterior insula and the adjacent
inferior frontal gyrus. The authors proposed that the in-
sula and the ACC could provide an abstract representa-
tion of the self that might participate in maintaining the
sense of self. Similarly, another study addressing the rela-
tion of trait adjectives to the own person and an acquain-
tance identified insular and anterior cingulate cortex
activation to differentiate between self and other reference
with a self-specificity for insular activity [25].
An electroencephalography study [12] reported reflect-
ive self-reference in contrast to other-reference to acti-
vate more DMPFC regions and the right anterior insula.
Pre-reflective self-reference was accompanied by left in-
sular and dorsal and ventral prefrontal activities. This is
consistent with our findings assuming that we did not
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differentiate between pre-reflective aspects and reflective
self-reference. Pre-reflective self, or ‘minimal’ self, was
defined as ‘consciousness of oneself as an immediate
subject of experience, not extended in time’ [68]. A con-
tribution of the ‘minimal’ self as a basic function may
generally be present in self-referential processing and,
particularly, during self-reflection. The task we used in
this study was supposed to involve both reflective and
pre-reflective processes, which is reflected by our find-
ings on brain activation.
The other brain region specifically activated under the
conditions of ‘self ’ was the IPL comprising the region
‘PF’ [69], the ventral intraparietal cortex corresponding
to the IPL and parts of the postcentral bank hosting the
SSC. These regions are strongly associated with somato-
sensory processing, especially the anterior bank of the
parietal lobule, and also integrate visual and auditory in-
formation [69-71]. They may thus form a higher-order
perceptional representation of the self as a result of inte-
gration of multimodal sensory information. In this study,
these areas were active in the mental condition, support-
ing a concept that they may also provide for a self-
representation when mentally directing attention to one-
self or when a self-image is required for reflection pur-
poses or for self-identification.
We confirm earlier findings that the mentioned areas
of the brain are associated with self-reflection, whereby
our strict and conservative approach has to be consid-
ered with regard to areas not reported, such as the an-
terior medial prefrontal cortex regions, the temporal
cortex and the subcortical regions as upper brainstem
[2,9,43].
Results on self-reflection processes may have implica-
tions for psychiatric disorders which have self-related
psychopathologies [1,72-75]. There is evidence that, for
example, depression and social anxiety disorder are both
associated with a heightened cognitive, mostly rumina-
tive self-focus, pointing to dysfunctional activation of
brain areas involved in self-related processing [1,76,77].
A prominent part of self-related processing in affective
disorders such as depression occurs without external
stimuli, which is comparable to the conditions used in
the present study. A task for the future will be to assess
the involved regions of the brain for possible alterations
in self-processing, such as, for example, dysfunctional
attractors in depression.
Conclusion
Our findings underline the concept of a primary involve-
ment of medial and also lateral prefrontal, parietal and
insular regions in self-related processing, demonstrated
here with an experimental task abstaining from exter-
nally oriented behavioural requirements. These areas, as
the DMPFC, were also active while reflecting on others,
thus putting a certain self-selectivity into perspective.
Specificity for self-related activation was shown only in
the ACC and in regions of the inferior parietal cortex
associated with somatosensation. From a methodological
viewpoint, we emphasize here the expected and plausible
association of these areas with a mental self-related con-
dition in the absence of external stimuli and without
required behavioural responses. This underlines the pos-
sibility of using such an approach for investigating self-
related neural processing. The reported areas may be
considered when investigating disturbed self-related pro-
cessing in psychiatric disorders.
Methods
Participants
Twenty-five healthy subjects (aged 23-41 years, 17
females, all right-handed according to a handedness ques-
tionnaire [78]) were contacted by direct address or mailing
lists. Subjects were screened for exclusion criteria such as
prior and current neurological or psychiatric illnesses, the
use of medication or other psychotropic substances (ex-
cluding contraceptives), pregnancy, excessive consumma-
tion of alcohol, cigarettes and caffeine, and the general
contraindications for fMRI. The study was approved by
the ethics committee of the canton of Zürich (project nr.
E 62/2007) and conducted in compliance with the Decla-
ration of Helsinki. All subjects provided their written
informed consent. After scanning, subjects completed a
post-experimental non-structured interview on their per-
formance of the task. Two subjects reported sleepiness
and lack of concentration during fMRI and one subject
showed several movement artefacts (sudden head move-
ments of more than 3 mm). The data for these three sub-
jects were, therefore, excluded from the analysis. The
other subjects confirmed that they had been able to follow
the instructions.
Prior to scanning photographs of each subject (‘self ’)
or for each subject of a person known to him/her
(‘known’; work or study colleague but not a close friend
or a relative since intense emotional relationships would
interfere with the results), or of a person of the same sex
and not known by the subjects (‘unknown’) were obtained.
The photographs were taken within the grounds of the
Psychiatric University Hospital, Zurich. Situations, posi-
tions (portrait in relation to whole body), background and
perspectives were standardized in a script (for examples of
the photographs, see Figure 4). Subjects were instructed
to display relaxed and neutral facial expressions and body
positions, in particular not to express any explicit emo-
tions, although a normal friendly ‘photo-smile’ was per-
mitted. Clothing was neutral and casual. Photographs
presented to each subject of always the same known per-
son and always the same unknown person and were
matched for gender and approximate age. The subjects
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were shown photographs of the known person and the
unknown person prior to scanning.
Experimental design
The experimental task comprised a cue indicating the
trial conditions, a period for mental reflection without
external stimuli, then a period for perception of the rele-
vant photograph (Figure 4). To investigate only the
process of self-referential reflection, the subjects were
instructed to generate self-reflective cognitions in the
absence of external stimulation other than the short ab-
stract cue (1 s) indicating the beginning of the trial and
the person concerned. The periods for reflection lasted
less than 10 s, thus primarily representing the induction
and early phase of mental reflective processes. Photo-
graphs of themselves were introduced to each subject in
order to compare brain activities under conditions of re-
flexion and perception. Self-reflection and perception
were also controlled under conditions of reflection on
and perception of either a known or an unknown per-
son. The ‘known’ condition consisted of a period to re-
flect on a person who had a distant relationship to the
subject’s self, such as a colleague or an acquaintance.
The ‘unknown’ condition, serving as a control, consisted
of a period for reflection on an unknown person, fol-
lowed by the viewing of a photograph of this unknown
person.
Each trial period was initiated by a cue as instruction
and terminated by the disappearance of the photographs
(Figure 4). The subjects were instructed and trained be-
fore scanning as follows: “The cue indicates a person
who will later appear in a photograph. In the period that
follows, reflect about that person, who and how she/he
is or might be, for instance ‘who am I, how am I as a
person’ or ‘who and how is she/he’. When the photo-
graph is presented, just look at the photo”. The instruct-
ing cues for self: ○, known:  or unknown: ◊, were
presented for 1 s. They were graphically abstract and
without any intrinsic meaning. Including the cue, the re-
flection conditions lasted 9900 ms, equivalent to 5 TRs
(repetition time for the fMRI volumes). The photographs
were presented for 5940 ms, equivalent to 3 TRs. Then, a
baseline period of 8 TRs followed until the next trial was
started. In total, each subject performed each condition 12
times in a randomized order. The task was programmed
with PresentationTM, Neurobehavioral Systems, USA.
After scanning, subjects were interviewed on their ability
to perform the task; all included subjects were completely
able and fulfilled this criterion. The main information
reported for self-reference were individual facts (such as
name, age, employment and family status) as well as auto-
biographical and future-oriented pieces of information
(such as “I was born in . . .”, “I want to be . . .”, “I am . . .”).
The subjects were not questioned on the personal content
of their reflection in order to avoid self-confrontation or
the disclosure of private thoughts.
When designing the experimental task, we purposely
did not use external stimuli or an external relation as
Figure 4 Schematic summary of the paradigm. The paradigm comprises a cued reflection period followed by perception of a photograph to
the cued person for the indicated periods of time. For each condition, the same standardized set of photographs was shown in a random order.
The subjects were instructed to reflect on the cued person in the ‘reflection’ period and to view the photograph during the ‘perception’ period
(photos reprinted here with explicit consent of the shown subjects).
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implemented motor responses, nor did we use cognitive
or behavioural task for instance requiring decision mak-
ing. This was to avoid any interference with the self-
reflection process, and, hence, to enable us to focus on
the mental component of the reflection task. Such, the
solely mental self-reference is meant in the sense of an
absence of possibly interrupting external stimuli. One
might argue that a behavioural response for task per-
formance or a control for attentiveness during the task
is lacking, but such an additional task would have direc-
ted the attention of the subjects to the performance of
this controlling task and away from the performance of
the primary task. In order to control for subject atten-
tiveness and cooperation, the direct task-related activity
in each subject’s primary visual cortex was controlled to
assure that at least visual perception was functional
since, for example, closing of the eyes would have
resulted in missing or low activity in the visual cortex at
least during the perception of the pictures.
Image acquisition
Imaging was performed using a 3.0 T GE SignaTM HD
Scanner (GE Medical Systems, Milwaukee, USA, 8-channel
head coil). Echo-planar imaging (EPI) was performed for
fMRI (TR/TE 1980/32 ms, 22 sequential axial slices, whole
brain, 3.5 mm slice thickness, 1 mm gap, resulting voxel
size 3.125×3.125×4.5 mm, matrix 64×64 voxel, 200 mm
field of view, 70° flip angle). 468 volumes were obtained per
subject, 16 volumes per trial. The first 4 volumes were dis-
carded to allow for T2 equilibration effects. High-resolution
3-D T1-weighted anatomical volumes were acquired (TR/
TE 9.9/2.9 ms; matrix size 256×256 mm; 1×1×1 mm
resolution, axial orientation) for co-registration with the
functional data. T2-weighted images in parallel to the EPI
sequence were acquired to exclude possible T2-sensitive
abnormalities. The stimuli were presented via digital video
goggles (Resonance Technologies, Northridge, CA).
Data analysis and statistics
FMRI data were analyzed using BrainVoyagerTM QX
1.10.1 (Brain Innovation, Maastricht, The Netherlands
[79]). Pre-processing of the functional scans included
motion correction, slice scan time correction, temporal
high-pass filtering and removal of linear trends. Func-
tional images were superimposed on the anatomical
images and incorporated into 3-D data sets. The individ-
ual 3-D data sets were transformed into Talairach space
[80], with a resulting voxel size of 3 × 3 × 3 mm, then
spatially smoothed with an 8-mm Gaussian kernel for
subsequent group analysis. Six predictors, representing
the three conditions each of reflection (refl) and percep-
tion (perc, refl-self, perc-self, refl-known, perc-known,
refl-unknown, perc-unknown) were used to build the de-
sign matrix. Single trials with fMRI signal artefacts of
more than threefold mean signal change amplitude (e.g.
due to head movements) were eliminated. The trial peri-
ods were modelled as epochs using a two-gamma
hemodynamic response function adapted to the applied
period duration provided by BrainVoyager.
The fMRI data analysis, based on the general linear
model, comprised the following steps: First, fixed effects
analyses were calculated separately for each subject
under the conditions of reflection and perception for
‘self ’, ‘known’, ‘unknown’, each resulting in summary
images. The summary images were subjected to second-
level random effects group analyses, also using conjunc-
tions (&). Three-dimensional statistical parametric maps
were calculated for the group analysis with separate sub-
ject predictor using random effects analyses, whereby we
controlled for and avoided the minimum-t problem [81]
by building masks of the single contrasts and verifying that
the resulting clusters from the conjunctions are within
these clusters and such represent a logical AND-condition.
The statistical threshold for reporting results was set to p
< 0.005 and to a cluster-wise level of p< 0.01 (considering
the Talairach voxels of 3 × 3× 3) mm after correction for
multiple comparisons by application of the respective clus-
ter thresholds according to a Monte Carlo simulation [79].
We were interested in brain activity during self-reflection
and in this context for “self-specific” activation meaning
here significantly more activation in the self-conditions
than in the other conditions with these not showing activa-
tion. Therefore, the main contrasts were:
Self-specific conjoined comparison in the reflection
period:
(refl-self> refl-known) & (refl-self> refl-unknown)
as primary outcome measure.
To identify areas with greater activity during self-
reflection than during self-perception, the additional
conjunction with the contrast (refl-self> perc-self ) re-
sulting in the contrast:
(refl-self> refl-known) & (refl-self> refl-unknown) &
(refl-self> perc-self )
as secondary outcome measure.
To differentiate the contributions of each separate
condition to the clusters resulting from the conjunction
analyses (and corresponding to the main effect), we
conducted a post-hoc analysis in which an additional
random-effects analysis within the resulting clusters was
performed to determine the effects of each single condi-
tion on brain activity. Self-selectivity in our context was
defined as significant activity in a region during reflec-
tion or perception only under the ‘self ’-condition and
not under the conditions ‘known’ or ‘unknown’.
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For reasons of comparison with previous studies addres-
sing self-selectivity during the perception of pictures of
the own and other persons, the conjunction (perc-self>
perc-known) & (perc-self> perc-unknown) was analyzed.
In the resulting clusters with self-selective activation char-
acteristics, the effects of the individual conditions were
investigated in a post-hoc random-effects analysis as
described above.
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